BRICS’ future in a changing world order

(Mains GS 2 : Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.)

Context:

• In the face of the dynamic economic and financial shifts of the 2010s, the worldwide pandemic, and economic, social, and political disruptions caused by it BRICS members still find room for alignment of interests.

Productive journey:

• Launched by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006 and riding on the political synergy created by regular summits since 2009, BRIC turned itself into BRICS in 2010, with the entry of South Africa. 
• The grouping has gone through a reasonably productive journey and strove to serve as a bridge between the Global North and Global South.
•  It developed a common perspective on a wide range of global and regional issues; established the New Development Bank; created a financial stability net in the form of Contingency Reserve Arrangement; and is on the verge of setting up a Vaccine Research and Development Virtual Center.

China’s domination:

• Some analysts argue that BRICS came into being because of their shared vision of a new global order. 
• This new order was supposed to be based on the conviction that no single state nor any alliance or group of states should be allowed to take a dominant position in international affairs. 
• But this clearly is no longer true as China’s rise and its towering position within the group, both in its political and economic weight and its challenging posture towards the United States (US) and the West, in general, doesn’t align with this vision and vis à vis the individual aims of the other BRICS.

Russia’s invasion:

• The sensitive balance of the world order has vanished into thin air with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as it brought about a polarization of national positions which was last seen during the Cold War.
• Again, just like in the case of the previous Russo-Ukrainian conflict of 2014, BRICS took an ambiguous stance and no one can expect the members of the group to outrightly condemn the invasion of Ukraine, for Russia is one of its members. 
• To confirm this argument further, one can add China’s overly anti-Western stand and its proclamation of an unlimited partnership with Russia; India’s historical ties with Russia (originally focused on security matters, but significantly broadened into many areas of economy), and Brazil and South Africa maintaining their friendly relations with their European partner.

Constructive dialogue:

• BRICS’s future as a forum of constructive dialogue and as a promoter for a multipolar shift in world politics, giving more visibility to Global South’s perspective, depends much on Russia’s and China’s stand on whether they will want to engage and to what extent, or rather push for changes desired by them alone. 
• In this respect, Western powers should pay much attention to the positions of the other Southern states, given their recent independent policy stands from the West, and whether they will be allured by the envisaged new era of international relations laid out by President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping.

Conclusion:

• From the point of view of BRICS’s future, attention should be paid to India’s position and whether the West will be able to meet its security and development needs so that it could weigh in against China’s dominance in the group.