China’s takeaways from the war

(Mains GS 2 : Bilateral, Regional and Global Groupings and Agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.)

Context:

• Like India, China also abstained on the U.S.-sponsored United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution condemning Russia for the invasion of Ukraine.

Bigger consequences:

• China’s reasons for abstaining from voting at the UNSC as well as its gains and expectations from the invasion are unique to its own situation.
• In 2014 too, China decided to abstain when the last vote against Russian aggression in Crimea came up for vote in the UNSC as did the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum.
• However, there are far bigger consequences this time since the full-scale invasion and Ukrainian resistance are leading to more uncertain outcomes.

Responsible power:

• China's status as a responsible power is important for China because this year, the Communist Party of China is slated to hold the 20th National Party Congress.
• External stability, an enabling external environment and a positive perception and recognition of China’s role in the world would help the party at home too.
• Many observers have noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have informed Chinese President Xi Jinping of his intentions to invade Ukraine when he visited Beijing for the opening of the Winter Olympics.

Silence on the war:

• By trying to engage the peace process, China would like to avoid renewed criticisms of it being a selfish power.
• In the last few days, the U.S. media has been trying to argue that the U.S. must make China pay for its silence on the war.
• Recently, an op-ed published in The New York Times had alleged that U.S. intelligence had sought China’s help in dissuading Mr. Putin against the invasion, but China underplayed Russia’s intentions and brushed those concerns under the carpet.

Strategic outcomes:

• While China may be surprised by the way the invasion has progressed, the war is not an entirely negative outcome for China because as a consequence of this invasion, the West will possibly direct its attention away from China.
• Thus, China will not remain the principal villain in the eyes of the liberal world, which it has been since it has unilaterally been constructing islands in the South China Sea, and since reports of human rights violations in Xinjiang have increased.
• One might also see a reduction in China’s ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ as it senses an opportunity to mediate and create a stake in the settlement process.
• Further, Russia is imposing costs on the West by stretching its military budgets is also a good thing for China as this will divert Europe’s attention to its neighbourhood and away from the Indo-Pacific and possibly delay its engagements with the Quad.

Destabilise the region:

• Beijing also sees a pattern in Ukraine’s engagement with Europe and fears its repetition in Central Asia where Russian and Chinese interests converge in keeping democratic interventions away.
• For all the rhetoric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s mandates of fighting “terrorism, extremism and splittism”, the principal shared concern for China and Russia is that of externally instigated regime changes, which force democratisation in Central Asia and destabilise the region.
• That is why China, while continuing to appeal to Russia to resolve its issues with Ukraine, has been rather stern vis-à-vis the U.S. by calling the latter’s sanctions on Russia and military promises to Ukraine as being akin to adding fuel to the fire.

Conclusion:

• China would be studying Russian posturing and signalling, such as putting the nuclear deterrent forces on high alert, and the response from the U.S., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, individual European countries and the UNSC for its own turn if China were to consider a military solution in Taiwan.