India's Preparedness against Two-pronged Attack

The Indian Military has been talking about a two-front war with neighbors Pakistan and China for decades to keep politicians focused on defense spending. Now that scenario is looking ever more realistic, with conflicts flaring on both its disputed borders.Talks earlier between top Chinese and Indian army commanders in the Ladakh region ended without a major breakthrough, the second such attempt to cool things down since 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops were killed on June 15 in their worst clash in four decades. Around the same time, weapons and explosives were recovered and two suspected terrorists were killed after a 15-hour gun battle some 660 kilometers (410 miles) away in South Kashmir, officials said.India has fought four wars with China and Pakistan since it gained freedom from British rule in 1947, but it has

never had to defend both borders at the same time. Indian military officials are growing concerned that China and Pakistan might gang up on New Delhi at a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Government is faced with surging coronavirus infections.“New Delhi is clearly under great pressure, whether from Covid-19, along the Line of Control in Kashmir, or from China,” said Ian Hall, Professor of international relations at Griffith University in Queensland, Australia, and author of ‘Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy.’ “We have seen relations with both Islamabad and Beijing worsen over the past few years, and the result is that both have decided to escalate things during the pandemic, when the Modi Government is stretched and distracted.”The Indian military is huge and contingencies are always kept in mind, said a senior security official who wasn’t authorized to speak to the press. But despite the planning, the need to commit resources to two fronts at the same time would stretch the armed forces.It’s an eventuality India’s army chief has warned of, urging the government -- including its diplomatic corps -- to be prepared to step in to avoid it.“As far as two front war is concerned it is a possibility,” General Manoj Mukund Naravane, India’s Chief of Army Staff, said in May. “A country does not go to war with its armed forces alone. It has other pillars like diplomatic corp and other organs of government which will come into play to make sure that we are not forced into a corner where we will have to deal with two adversaries at the same time and in full strength.”Indian and Chinese troops remain deployed eyeball-to-eyeball along the country’s northern boundary, the unmarked and contested Line of Actual Control, which saw tensions rise in early May. Both sides have amassed thousands of troops, artillery guns and tanks at multiple locations.The army said more diplomatic and military talks were planned “to ensure peace and tranquility” after military level negotiations ended without a clear outcome. In Beijing Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told reporters China hoped the two sides would “keep up close communication through military and diplomatic channels, and ease the situation and lower the temperature along the border.”At the same time, India’s 742-kilometer (460 miles) Line of Control with Pakistan has become equally active and tense. Indian troops have faced regular cross-border firing and engaged in counter-terror operations in the hinterland.India’s army said it killed 127 “terrorists” in the first six months of the year, about 30% higher from a year ago, according to a senior security official who asked not to be identified, citing rules for speaking with reporters. The incidents of cross-border firing recorded by the Indian military also doubled in 2020 compared to 2019. Pakistan’s foreign ministry in a statement blamed India for more than 1,500 “cease-fire violations” including deaths and injuries of civilians on their side of the Kashmir frontier this year.Some military formations which normally move to J&K to bolster the counter-insurgency operations along the Pakistan border in the summer months have now moved to the India-China border.“The Indian Army is a well-led professional force organized, equipped, trained, experienced and motivated to take on any commitments that it may be called for, be it internal or external,” Indian Army spokesperson Colonel Aman Anand said in response questions.Collusion between Pakistan and China to keep India’s western and northern borders on simmer at the same time is difficult to prove but cannot be ruled out, said Vipin Narang, associate professor of political science at MIT and author of ‘Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict.’Pakistan may feel like it needs to show resolve at home and to India in Jammu & Kashmir after India changed the province’s constitutional status in August last year, Narang said. Islamabad may “also be opportunistically taking advantage of India’s distraction and focus on the LAC.”The clash with “China is obviously a major embarrassment for India. What are India’s choices? It can’t attack China and throw them out and they know it,” said Mahmud Durrani, a retired lieutenant general and national security adviser in Pakistan. “The fallout of that can be that to prove their strength and muscles, they are going to do something with Pakistan -- the smaller partner of China. They will do something to prove to its people that ‘we are still strong’.Durrani said a “connection between the strategic movements between China and Pakistan” could also “be a possibility.”Whichever way it plays out, “it could be a very tense and bloody summer for India on both of its disputed borders,” Narang Said.

India’s Two-Front War: Myths and IAFs’ capability to fight:

The scenario wherein India is engaged with its traditional opponent in the western sector and the Red Dragon opens up the eastern front, or vice versa is a ‘sticky wicket’ to play on. Questions have been asked, war games have been played and strategies have been built around this scenario to get a feel and predict the requirements so as to be prepared for addressal in future. If an analysis of the probable situation is to be done the first item needing attention is the reality and the efficacy of a two-front war. Is it possible to have one and how effectively can the opponent(s) run the campaign?

Yes, a two-front war is a definite possibility in the Indian context nevertheless, the war envisaged, would be very difficult to coordinate and execute by the opponents. The worst-case scenario for India is, both, the western as well as eastern fronts being attacked simultaneously, thus forcing her to divide the war efforts. Any more coordinated effort by the enemies would require centralised command and control structures, aka WW II, which is envisaged not to be a possibility in the present situation. Thus, bereft of centralised command, the efficacy of a two-front attack and maintenance of the aim is diluted, giving India the edge. For India, it would now mean breaking down the war into three distinct major geographical theatres viz. the west theatre, encompassing the borders and sea we share with Pakistan, the north theatre, encompassing the border regions of Ladakh down south to the northwestern edge of Nepal and the northeastern theatre, encompassing border regions from the south-east of Nepal to all the way up to Arunachal and further down towards the south. The border regions of Nepal, approx 1500 km and that of Myanmar to the Far East is expected to be left off the main battle. This sounds rather rosy but in actuality would be a Herculean task for the centralised war room at Delhi to handle. Airpower which paves the way for all modern campaigns, need to match up to the challenges on all three fronts.

Interestingly, in the context of traditional air warfare, Pakistan stands at a better position to threaten India, than China would. Adequacy of airbases all along the border and a tight network of air defence system provide Pakistan just the required platform for an ideal offensive and subsequent defence. China whereas, all along its area of interest, lacks adequate airbases, the few they have are at very high altitudes, penalising the take-off requirements and all up weight performance. The PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) would have to be broken down, to at least four elements along the entire border and reaching the Indian assets, overflying Nepal or Myanmar, would not only involve international complexities but also the use of multiple air refuelling for every mission. However, on its plus side, China has a robust long-range air defence for most of its bases and vital points, not to forget its wide battery of “second artillery corps”. These missiles could and would prove a threat to India.

China has an arsenal of 2500 +, the surface to surface missiles of varying ranges and CEP (circular error of probability), with conventional warheads, which it would most certainly use against India in the opening wave. However, it needs to be said for IAF that a little care, planning and distribution of assets would render this threat to mostly a nuisance value, in the face of the enormity of the situation. Civilian targets addressed by these missiles are not being considered here, nor are nuclear warheads. It would be sacrilege to put in actual calculations involving range, warheads, CEP, target diversity & a few other factors, on an open platform, however, it is safe to say the IAF has adequate depth and diversity to nullify the effect of the Chinese SSBM (surface to surface ballistic missiles) rain, the logistics for it and the actual execution would no doubt be a massive task.

The government approved fighter squadron strength for the IAF is 42.5 squadrons of which the existing number of squadrons are in the thirties. The air defense element is undergoing a revamp and looks pretty potent, notwithstanding, for a two-front war this element requires a rather large boost, especially for enemy targets of interest, not within a military zone. Gone are the days of base defense only, its time for Air Defense Umbrella for larger areas. India’s missile force also needs work to be done on, at present, it is in a very juvenile state, a shade better than Pakistan’s. In conventional warfare, however, the SSBMs don’t really push much weight except for a few tactical ones, which could shape the immediate battlefield. The lift capability of the IAF, in the present state, is rather envious. During the last Ex Gagan Shakti in 2018 and related events of the time, the IAF had demonstrated this capability to the envy of our neighbors, interestingly enough, heavy lift capability of the IAF has increased since.

As and when it happens, in the western theatre, it would be a conventional air war like it has been for the past three full fledged wars with Pakistan. A lot of offensive air action would be seen, to make sure the PAF keeps its head down during the advance of the Indian Army. Also, offensive missions against supplies lines and feeder mechanisms would be undertaken at the onset of hostilities, in addition, missions to suppress the Pak Air defense would be required. These would be closely followed by the actions over the battlefieldwhere in our tactical fighters pound the Pak army. The entire offensive force would require a rock-solid defensive package, to give them cover from enemy fighters. The air battle here would be bloody and intense. The Rafales would welcome such a scenario to prove their multi-billion dollar worth.

The other two theatres would be pretty different, the Indian air battle here would mostly involve a defensive posture. Fewer missions for airfield busting and long-range interdiction would be flown, as compared to the battlefield strikes and shorter-range interdiction missions. It is to be appreciated that the same problems which plague the PLAAF, distance and altitude, causes problems for the IAF too. The Air defense of own assets would be one of the most important missions in these sectors. Since the Army is the one who would play a major role in most of the places in these sectors, from holding the ‘chickens neck’, to fighting the battle mainly in mountains, most IAF missions would be in support of our surface forces.

Needless to say, the entire IAF has a task cut out in a dual front war. This scenario is generally practised by the IAF during regular intervals, the last exhaustive one being Ex Gagan Shakti, in the first half of 2018. During this exercise, the IAF demonstrated its capability and reinforced its concept of a two front war. Also practised during this, was the swing effort from front to front and very successfully too. The effort was lauded the world over including, surprisingly, from the state-owned Chinese media. Serviceability rates and launch sustainability rates achieved during the exercise surpassed the USAF efforts at times. The IAF had similar number of fighter squadrons then as it does now, give or take one odd here and there. So are the number of squadrons now sufficient and we never need to reach the magic figure of 42.5?
The answer to the above is a big ‘NO’. Like Sam Manekshaw in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the IAF had adequate time to plan the entire orchestrated effort for the exercise, a privilege it wont have during actual action nowadays. The blueprint for the exercise was finalised at least two years ago, over the year prior, assets were developed, raised, maintained and nursed for use during the exercise. The capability was demonstrated with a dual message, for the country-to push for the assets so due to the airforce and for the world to take notice of the IAF as a major force.

Since advance notice in case of a present-day armed conflict would be most likely absent or minuscule, the IAF may be caught in an embarrassing situation with the present strength of its assets. It is here when the entire 42.5 squadrons of fighters and other approved machinery of the IAF are required, maybe, even more with the ever-changing face of warfare. The build-up is slow but seems to be steady over the last few years, the S-400s, the Rafales, the Akash, the LCAs, the Chinooks, the Apaches, the Globemasters, the Hercules, the Prithivis, etc, are all looking good at giving the IAF the required edge, but what looks excellent over the last few years is the will to attempt and succeed. This is by far the biggest force multiplier.

China’s Hikvision controls India’s surveillance market. Modi Government needs to do more than ban apps:

Of the 59 Chinese apps banned by the Narendra Modi government, all the buzz has been over TikTok. But there is one Chinese company that dominates India’s CCTV market that never made it into the list. It is named Hikvision, which has cleverly projected itself as part of the prime minister’s ‘Make in India’ initiative. The US Department of Defense named Hikvision, along with 19 other firms, as being “either owned or controlled by the Chinese military”. In fact, the US had already invoked the National Defense Authorization Act and prohibited government agencies from purchasing video surveillance products from Hikvision. The Australian government has expressed similar concerns, and there was even an uproar in the UK. The wars of tomorrow will be fought as much in our mountains as in the technology sphere. The troughs along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) will shape our conflicts as much as a 5G network. We need to reclaim our physical territory as much as take back our digital spaces. The Modi government’s app ban does not even begin to scratch the surface.

Hikvision’s domination:

Hikvision is one of the world’s largest video surveillance companies producing both hardware and software tools. It is central to China’s ambitions to become the world’s leading supplier of surveillance systems. Hikvision sells cameras and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allowing security agencies to monitor railway stations, roads, etc. It is a darling of the Communist Party of China (CPC), having been heralded as a ‘national AI Champion” in 2019. As per a 2019 report, around 42 per cent of the company is controlled by state enterprises, with China Electronics Technology HIK Group owning nearly 40 per cent. Hikvision controlled 21 per cent of the world’s CCTV market in 2017. Hikvision exists in India under the name Prama Hikvision Indian Private Limited. As per reports, Hikvision enjoys over 35 per cent market share in India. Its 2019 annual report said it has established a local factory in India — its first overseas production base. It is 58 per cent owned by the parent Chinese company. The Indian partner is Ashish P. Dhakan, who started the collaboration in 2005. It has declared serious investment plans for India. Hikvision had presented itself as a significant Make in India partner at the 2018 IFSEC Conference — South Asia’s largest security conference — held in New Delhi. As per the 2018 annual report, the company made “major project breakthroughs in India”.

That year, it won a tender from the Delhi government to install 1.5 lakh CCTV cameras in the national capital. It is also listed as a vendor by Bharat Electronics (BEL), which works on highly sensitive and classified defence projects for the government of India. More worryingly, Hikvision has allegedly also supplied solutions to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Special Protection Group (SPG), which is responsible for the security of the prime minister. Clearly, the security and privacy risks at play here are best left to one’s imagination. This leaves India with a tricky situation. Admittedly such companies do create secondary economic benefits for India with the local assembly and selling units creating jobs at home. However, there is arguably a bigger price India pays in terms of handing its CCTV grid to a country that is in no mood to offer any concessions to us.

What India can do:

For starters, the Modi government needs to make a clear list or database of all its current installations. Second, it needs to review all installations that would be considered critical or with a national security implication, and then seriously consider replacing them with a local alternative. If that is not feasible, the government needs to wrap such installations with third party (non-Chinese) encryption tools, which would disable any back doors that may exist. Third, India must prohibit Hikvision from participating in any ongoing or future government tenders. Fourth, the government needs to contemplate increasing local ownership and control of the Indian subsidiary. An innovative solution would be to purchase the 58 per cent stake in Hikvision — either the government could be an investor or it could be enabled by other Indian businesses or funds. Fifth, the Modi government needs to impose a legal obligation for regular audits to check for any security vulnerabilities with serious penalties for non-compliance or negligence.

Lastly, like the Chinese, India too needs to create local champions. In India, this is always the hardest part — less access to capital, poor procurement processes, etc. Most of the technology and subcomponents for Hikvision come from the United States. It is important to remind ourselves that with enough government support, India too can build local champions of technology. Often those on the government procurement side use price as an excuse to prefer Chinese over Indian vendors. But it’s a lazy argument. Yes, Chinese vendors and their products are often cheaper, but it is because they have worked on these things for decades. Cheap is also not always better and certainly not more secure. As India considers the next steps, it is important to not penalise and demonise the Indian entrepreneur behind the local subsidiary. They are not to blame. It shouldn’t take a border stand-off and loss of lives for such issues to be tackled head-on.

Why Pakistan is keeping mum about India-China LAC conflict:

As India tries to sort out its tension with China, Pakistan’s relative silence is noticeable. Although intently watching the India-China conflict, Islamabad’s contribution has not extended beyond the ceasefire violations to some significant ratcheting up the temperature at the Line of Control. If anything, there is the concern that New Delhi may initiate some form of fighting to assuage any domestic concerns regarding the Narendra Modi government’s inability to strongly stand up to China. While responding to Beijing in Ladakh or other places where China has critical interests may take longer for India, the domestic embarrassment could be minimised by increasing temperature with Pakistan. The idea of India starting a limited conflict with Pakistan instead is presented in two articles published within a week of each other from sources that have the ears of the military establishment. This in itself indicates how the military either sees the situation or would like the people to understand it.In a recent article, the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief talked about a combined China-Pakistan effort against India with the hope to solve the Kashmir issue. However, the article expressed a wish that the two countries should have collaborated before the launch of the crisis in Ladakh. But the fact of the matter is that there is no indication of any extraordinary movement by Pakistan at the Line of Control (LoC) or the northern areas.

Measuring the Strength:

PreQ: What is GAGAN SHAKTI ?

(a) A fighter plane
(b) Surface to Air Missile
(c) Military Exercise undertaken in 2018
(d) None of the above

MainsQ: “Pakistan would prove more dangerous than China in case of two pronged attack” Elaborate the statement by comparing the military strength of the trio. Would it be beneficial for China to launch a pre-emptive strike against India ? How prepared is India against a two pronged attack ? Analyse.