Indo – US Relationship under the new Regime

India has shared moments under the presidency of Trump, having too many shades, be it unwarranted interference in Kashmir issue by the US President or his browbeating on supply of hydroxychloroquine drug for the treatment of Covid – 19. Through “howdy Modi” the world not only witnessed the friendship of the two Heads of the States, but also saw a sort of election campaigning by a head of state in favour of another one “Abki bar, Trump Sarkar”.

But the question many Indians are asking is whether Joe Biden presidency in the United States would be better for New Delhi than a second term for Donald Trump.
Here is how Joe Biden has acted towards India in the past two decades.

In an interview with Rediff India Abroad in December 2006, Joe Biden had said, “My dream is that in 2020, the two closest nations in the world will be India and the United States.” He was then the Ranking Member in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), and was set to become the Chair of the Committee in January 2007, since the Democrats had flipped the Senate in the November 2006 election.

Biden had also just piloted, along with his Republican counterpart, committee chairman Richard Lugar, with a 85-12 vote, the enabling resolution that permitted moving forward with the negotiations on the breakthrough India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. This was eventually signed in October 2008. In the intervening two years, which saw several challenges to the deal in both countries, Biden had steadfastly heralded support in the US Senate, particularly from opposing members in his own party. This included then Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, who were influenced by concerns of the non-proliferation lobby. During an earlier incarnation as SFRC Chair, in 2001, Biden had written a letter to President George Bush in August 2001, calling for the removal of economic sanctions against India, which had been imposed since India’s nuclear tests of May 1998.

Speaking at the Mumbai Stock Exchange on 24 July 2013, during his visit to India as US Vice President, Biden had reiterated President Obama’s articulation that he saw the India-US relationship “as a defining partnership in the century ahead”. At an event last month commemorating India’s Independence Day, the Democratic presidential nominee said he would “stand with India” and that a Biden administration will “confront the threats (India) faces in its own region and along its border”, and there will be no tolerance for terrorism, cross border or otherwise.

Opportunity for India

It will be both a challenge and opportunity for India. At one level, it will be a platform that will target Chinese authoritarian practices, including in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. US leaders, including Biden, have repeatedly articulated India’s democracy and the commonality of values as a bedrock for the India-US relationship, and assessed this favourably in context of China and strategies for the Indo- Pacific.

However, in the Biden campaign agenda for the Muslim-American community, there is a call for restoring “rights for all people” in Kashmir, an assertion that restrictions on dissent, shutting or slowing down internet weaken democracies, and that Biden is “disappointed by NRC in Assam, CAA”, which is “inconsistent with the country’s long tradition of secularism and with sustaining a multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy”.

This is not just a reflection of the influence of the progressive wing of the party. Democratic chair of House Foreign Affairs and Ranking Member of Senate Foreign Relations Committees have sent a joint letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, expressing concern with India’s Citizenship Amendment Act. Several Democratic Indian-Americans in Congress, including vice presidential nominee Kamala Harris, and one of the rising progressive stars, Pramila Jayapal, have also spoken critically on these issues.

Both Biden and his main foreign policy adviser Anthony Blinken have said that any differences on this will be handled as a dialogue among friends and partners. In any case, the US has much to account for on its own, including issues related to voter suppression, gerrymandering of voting districts, and violence against African-Americans and other minorities.

Quad dynamics and China

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, also known as the Quad) is an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India that is maintained by semi-regular summits, information exchanges and military drills between member countries.

In the Trump years, India got into a pretty close embrace with the U.S. It signed all the ‘foundational’ agreements with America and bought billions of dollars worth of military hardware from them. The arms deals with the U.S. are a unique example when the country that buys tens of billions worth of arms has to be grateful to the vendor when it is a well-known fact that but for these sales, the military-industrial complex in the seller country will not be able to sustain itself. We resisted converting the Quad into a primarily military or strategic grouping, (what China perceives it to be) and is in fact aimed solely at containing China. The Quad is an anti-China coalition. How far it can be successful in containing the Dragon remains to be seen.

The outgoing U.S. Secretary of State and his deputy were quite candid in declaring that: India needed America as an ally and that the Quad will have to be formalised in future. In other words, the Quad will have to be institutionalised and expanded by adding additional members such as Taiwan and South Korea. As the External Affairs Minister has stated, India will not join any military alliance. That might remain the case in form, but given the fact that all the other three, and perhaps five or six in future, are already in strategic alliance with one another and with the U.S., it is highly likely that India too will be forced to agree to some form of military alliance at a future date. The government must have come to the conclusion that: we are simply not in a position to deal with China on our own and that we need external support. Even Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of non-alignment, asked the Americans for help at the time of the war with China in 1962.

There is nothing wrong per se in asking for support to protect our territorial integrity although it is evident that all these initiatives such as the Quad are maritime agreements and do not have much bearing on our dispute with China, which is continental in nature. The satellite imagery which the U.S. may provide in terms of the latest agreement concluded with the U.S. (the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geo-Spatial Cooperation) might be useful but it does not negate the premise that no external power would want to get involved on our side in case of major hostilities with China. On the other hand, if there is a major skirmish or worse in the South China Sea, the other members of the Quad will expect us to join them in fighting China, in an area far removed from our shores.

In addition to Israel and Saudi Arabia, Indian leaders also may miss Mr. Trump. If Mr. Biden adopts a more conciliatory approach towards China, we may find ourselves in a difficult situation. Since the U.S., under whatever presidency, will strictly follow its interests and may stage a somersault, we will be left alone in our confrontation with China. It is generally agreed that the U.S. has always needed an external enemy to keep its foreign policy focused, but that has not been the case so far with us.

In any case, we have the ‘other’ in the shape of Pakistan. (Mr. G. Parthasarathi, a very influential adviser to Mrs. Indira Gandhi once told me that it is good for India to always have some tension with Pakistan.) Do we need another ‘other’ in the shape of China? We do not want China to be permanently hostile to us; it will absorb huge resources, human and material. Invoking foreign threats with tough rhetoric might help domestically, but not always and not for long. The strong rhetoric employed in relation to China will need to be tempered. Public opinion which has been worked up against China may make it difficult to do so immediately but the government is efficient in managing and moulding public opinion.

Handling Iran

As for Iran — the other issue where Mr. Biden’s policy will be of great interest to us — it may be difficult for Mr. Biden to quickly reverse Mr. Trump’s adventurist policy towards Iran. It may not be possible, given the domestic compulsions, to readopt JCPOA in its original form, but he will surely, if slowly, engage Tehran in talks and negotiations through Oman or some other intermediary, to reduce tensions in the region. We should hope that he will not maintain the harsh unilateral sanctions that Mr. Trump imposed on Iran. We may be able to buy Iranian oil, and sell our pharma and other goods to that country. The government may also feel less constrained in investing openly in oil and other infra projects in Iran, including the rail project in which Indian Railways Construction Ltd has been interested. The government need not feel disappointed at Mr. Trump’s defeat. After all, he too was not all that sentimental about India; he did threaten us with ‘consequences’ if we did not give hydroxychloroquine pills to America.

Who is good for us: Republicans or Democrats ?

On account of longstanding Democratic activism on human rights and climate change issues, many in India wonder whether a Democratic or a Republican president is better for New Delhi.

It is useful to recall that it was a Republican Richard Nixon who had supported Pakistan in the 1971 conflict, and embarked on secret overtures in a bid to reconcile with China blindsiding India. It was a Republican Ronald Reagan who had strengthened Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by providing support and funds through it for “militant jihad” to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. India suffered a blowback through ISI-sponsored terrorism, first in Punjab and then in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it was a Democratic Bill Clinton who supported India during the 1999 Kargil conflict, and initiated the new relationship with India through a pathbreaking visit in 2000.
It was a Republican George Bush who transformed the framework for the relationship with the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. But it was a Democratic Obama who was the first US President to visit India twice in his tenure, once to attend the Republic Day function in 2015, and he articulated support for India’s permanent membership of United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and declared it to be a ‘major defence partner’. But it has been a Republican Donald Trump who has been unreasonable on trade issues, taking away GSP benefits, but has spoken highly of the relationship, and authorised higher level technology releases. What matters more, clearly, is the geopolitical context within which the bilateral relationship is placed.

Prospects under J Biden

Compared to Trump, Joe Biden will be more understanding on trade and economic issues, while calling for more reforms and opening up. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also spoken of India being a trusted partner, and part of global supply chains, while strengthening self-reliance. A Biden presidency will also be more accommodating on H1B and family visa issues, as well as the problems of the nearly five lakh undocumented persons in the US who are of Indian origin.

A Biden administration will explore common areas of work with China, on climate change and trade, but will be guided also by the deep recognition of economic and technological rivalry, and unfair Chinese practices. On 3 September, Biden issued a statement on Tibet, promising that he will meet with the Dalai Lama (which Trump has not done), and appoint a special coordinator for Tibet issues.

A Biden administration can also be expected to be more globally influential, with its declared intent to work with allies and partners, and in multilateral frameworks. Trump is seen as having weakened US influence in parts of Europe and elsewhere. In a recent UNSC vote on Iran, 13 countries, including US allies United Kingdom, France and Germany, did not vote with the US.

Trump and Biden will present differing opportunities and challenges: on trade, climate change, and human rights; but similarities on Pakistan and China.
As things stand, 2020 is the year of the Biden dream, both for himself (he has aspired to the presidency for more than 30 years), and for the India-US relationship. Let us see what awaits at the other end of the dream.

Measuring the depth:

PreQ: QUAD does not consist of which of the following countries ?

(a) Japan
(b) Australia
(c) New Zealand
(d) USA

MainQ: Discuss the significance of constitution and domain of operation of “the Quad”. With the change in Presidency in USA, what prominent changes do you expect, are likely to take place in this forum ? Given the track record of both the leaders, whose Presidency will be beneficial for India- Donald Trump or J Biden ? Illustrate your answer with befitting arguments.